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Recent Developments 
SNOWDEN v. STATE OF MARYLAND: 
Introduction of Testimonial Hearsay Statements Made by an 
Available Witness who Does Not Testify Violates the Sixth 
Amendment's Confrontation Clause 
By: Lama Cutter 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the 
introduction of testimonial hearsay statements made by an available 
witness who does not testify violates the Sixth Amendment's 
Confrontation Clause. Snowden v. State, 156 Md. App. 139, 846 A.2d 
36 (2004). In so holding, the court ruled that a social worker's 
testimony encompassing statements from children she previously 
interviewed, who did not testify, were barred from being introduced 
against the children's alleged abuser. Id. 
In late January 2002, three young girls, all under the age of 
twelve, told their mothers that Michael Snowden ("Snowden") 
touched them inappropriately. Snowden adamantly denied the 
accusations. The police were notified of the incidents and Snowden 
was arrested. During police questioning, Snowden wrote letters of 
apology to the children, explaining that he never intended to touch 
them improperly. Snowden was later charged with six counts of third 
degree sexual offense and one count of child abuse. Eleven days after 
the arrest, Amira Abdul-Wakeel, a social worker employed by the 
Child Protective Services Division of the Montgomery County 
Department of Health and Human Services, interviewed the three 
children. 
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion pursuant to MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304, to introduce Abdul-Wakeel's testimony 
in place of the children's testimony. Snowden objected to Abdul-
Wakeel's testimony on the ground that the testimony would violate 
his right of confrontation, but the circuit court overruled his objection. 
Snowden was convicted of all charges, then filed an appeal to the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. Snowden challenged the 
constitutionality of section 11-304 and the trial court's admission of 
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Abdul-Wakeel's testimony. Snowden also alleged that there was 
insufficient evidence to prove he touched the girls for the purpose of 
sexual arousal. 
The court of special appeals first noted the implications of the 
Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, specifically a criminal 
defendant's right to confront and cross-examine witnesses testifying 
against them. ld. at 149-50, 846 A.2d at 42-43. The court recognized 
that hearsay statements may be introduced without violating a 
defendant's rights when the statement is either a firmly rooted 
hearsay exception or has particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 
ld. at 150, 846 A.2d at 43. 
The Maryland Legislature responded to the particularized 
guarantee of trustworthiness exception by enacting section 11-304, 
also known as the "tender years statute." ld. at 151, 846 A.2d at 44. 
section 11-304 permits hearsay declarations to be introduced 
regardless of whether the child testifies. ld. at 146, 846 A.2d at 40. If 
the child does not testify, however, section 11-304 requires the 
existence of corroborative evidence that the defendant had the 
opportunity to commit the alleged crime. ld. In determining whether 
a statement contains particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, 
section 11-304 mandates that a court evaluate thirteen factors, 
interview the child, then record a finding specifically stating the 
statement's guarantees of trustworthiness. ld. at 151, 846 A.2d at 43. 
In this case, the court, without explanation, was satisfied that the 
circuit court completed the statutory procedures. ld. at 151, 846 A.2d 
at 44. 
Before reaching a conclusion, the court recognized the 
mandates of witness unavailability and previous opportunity for 
cross examination that were established by the recent Supreme Court 
case, Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). Snowden, 156 Md. 
App. at 156, 846 A.2d at 46. In Crawford, the defendant's conviction 
was reversed based on the violation of his confrontation rights. ld. at 
153-54, 846 A.2d at 44. The trial judge allowed police officers to testify 
about disclosures made to them by the defendant's wife. ld. at 153, 
846 A.2d at 45 (discussing Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1358). The trial court 
in Crawford found the statements contained particularized guarantees 
of trustworthiness, but the Washington Court of Appeals disagreed 
and reversed the conviction. Snowden, 156 Md. at 153, 846 A.2d at 45. 
Thereafter, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed by concurring 
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with the trial court's finding of trustworthiness. Id. Crawford 
challenged the conviction's reinstatement and appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. Id. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Crawford, distinguished 
two types of out-of-court statements: "those that are 'testimonial' and 
those that are not." Id. at ISS, 846 A.2d at 46. Simplistically reasoned, 
testimonial statements violate the Confrontation Clause because the 
Confrontation Clause only deals with testimony. Id. Although the 
court never provided a concrete list of testimonial or non-testimonial 
statements, it did consider ex parte in-court testimony, or its 
equivalent (Le. affidavits, custodial examinations) and "extrajudicial 
statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions" to be 
testimonial statements. Id. at 155 n.26, 846 A.2d at 46. 
In the case at bar, the court of special appeals found Abdul-
Wakeel's statements to be testimonial, and therefore, they violated the 
Confrontation Clause. Id. at 157, 846 A.2d at 47. The court reasoned 
the children were only interviewed with the purpose of developing 
Abdul-Wakeel's testimony. Id. Further, the court noted that the State 
did not establish that the children were unavailable to testify, and as 
such, failed to satisfy Crawford's foundational requirements of the 
declarant's unavailability and the accused's prior opportunity for 
cross-examination. Id. at 157 n.31, 846 A.2d at 47. The court, in 
examining whether section 11-304 violated the Confrontation Clause, 
only stated that 
when the admissibility of 
nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, the 
individual states are entitled to 
determine what statements should be 
admitted and what statements should 
be excluded, but when testimonial 
evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common 
law required: unavailability and a prior 
opportunity for cross examination. 
Id. at 156-57~ 846 A.2d at 47. 
50 
Finally, the court held that sufficient evidence did exist to 
convict Snowden of child abuse and third-degree sexual offense. Id. 
at 158, 846 A.2d at 48. The court noted the facts of the case. First, the 
children were interviewed by Abdul-Wakeel only in regards to a child 
sexual abuse case, pursuant to statutory provisions. Id. Second, the 
children believed they were improperly touched by Snowden, 
regardless of whether the incidents actually occurred. Id. at 159, 846 
A.2d at 48. Third, Snowden was arrested and voluntarily wrote 
letters of apology to the children, which indicated the incidents did 
occur in the manner and locations Abdul-Wakeel described. Id. at 
159,846 A.2d at 48-49. Finally, Snowden, by writing the letters, hoped 
the children, or more importantly, their mothers, would accept his 
apology and forgo pursuing the charges. Id. 
Accordingly, the court explored the issue of double jeopardy 
and concluded that when an appellate court reverses on the basis of 
an erroneous admission of hearsay testimony, rather than on the basis 
of insufficient evidence, the accused is entitled to a new trial. Id. at 
161,846 A.2d at 50 (See State v. Boone, 284 Md. 1,393 A.2d 1361 (1978)). 
Hence, the court remanded the case and ordered a new trial, which 
barred the introduction of Abdul-Wakeel's testimony. Id. at 161-:62, 
846 A.2d at 50. 
In Snowden v. State, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
clearly followed the new requirements concerning hearsay 
declarations set by Crawford v. Washington. Maryland courts must 
follow the rigid preconditions of the declarant's unavailability and the 
accused's prior opportunity for cross-examination in order to allow 
the introduction of hearsay testimony without violating the accused's 
Sixth Amendment rights. Because of these prerequisites, and because 
the court failed to formally address whether section 11-304 was 
unconstitutional, Maryland may now have to reconsider its 
evidentiary guidelines. Consequently, in order to comply with the 
recent federal transformation in evidentiary rules, Maryland may 
have to either revise section 11-304 or propose a new statute to replace 
section 11-304 altogether. 
Editor's Note: The Court of Appeals 0/ Maryland heard the State's 
appeal on December 3, 2004. This journal will report on that decision 
in Volume 35.2, which will be published in the spring 0/2005. 
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